On How to Deal With Terrorism
Posner on the Constitution, a book review.
Instapundit has a good bunch of comments and compliations on the terrorism issue.
But seriously, who's overreacting and puffing out their chests? It would be silly to ignore the Islamo-Fascists who've demonstrated their desire to attack us. Instapundit hits it right when he says, "Before 9/11 -- and what we learned afterward -- I agreed with the basic strategy of trying to contain Islamist terror until it collapsed under the weight of its own stupidity. That was before I realized how widespread it was, and how thoroughly intertwined with hostile states it was. I don't fault the Clinton people for not catching on before I did."
And the thing about 9/11 that was so different from the prior Al Queda attacks was how clever it was. You could see clearly that a mixture of smart planners (KSM and Atta) with good leaders (Bin Laden, Zawahri) could cause such an incredible mess...and all of a sudden it became possible to imagine a much worse scenario given more time, resources, and technology to these groups.
Now maybe, at the very least, you could argue that Al Queda is a unique strand of Islamic Fundamentalism, a freaky one off, like the Blair Witch Project, and we've essentially destroyed that strand and that's the best we can do. Hamas and Hezbollah have no desire to attack the US - so we don't really need to worry about them. Iraq was a complete waste of time and money.
Under that logic you could argue that all the money spent on homeland security, extra airline checks, and so forth is a complete waste, that perhaps we should have put locks on pilots cabins and checked our databases better.
And believe me, I have sympathy for this view. I work at USC, a bureaucratic mess, with untold number of regulations and policies that basically just make it difficult for everyday people to function. There doesn't seem to be any logic to all of it put together - it makes sense from little spheres, but not from a holistic, student or employee approach.
I imagine the Homeland Security Department working the same way, but charged with a semi-impossible task - protect us from attacks. It's a no thanks job. It's a job that isn't appreciated when they're doing it - they're viewed as a burden, but when they don't stop an attack, whether it's their fault or not, well, they're to blame.
Sort of like being a producer on a student movie.
Anyhow, what's the point of all of this?
I certainly think there's been a bit of overreaction in the security apparatus post-9/11, but that's to be expected. The fire department limited Father's Office to only a certain number of patrons until they opened another door. I think that was a bit of an overreaction, too, but that's how the world is. People act and then react and it's not always going to be a perfectly efficient model.
Whether Iraq was an overreaction or not...I still don't think so. I think it's proven a lot tougher and more costly and had we all known what would happen there in hindsight, the realist in me would have balked a little more. But I think the logic for going in intially was solid and wasn't the result of an overreaction to the terrorist threat at all. It made sense in light of the events, the biggest obstacle was and should have been the lack of support from allies.
But anyways, the world goes on, overreaction or not, we learn from our mistakes, get wiser, get older, pass on lessons to the next generation, try do better. What's the big deal?
3 comments:
I present the following views in the spirit of debate, and mean no personal ill will:
"But I think the logic for going in intially was solid and wasn't the result of an overreaction to the terrorist threat at all. It made sense in light of the events, the biggest obstacle was and should have been the lack of support from allies."
1) I don't think the logic for going into Iraq was solid, but that's something we've discussed before. Things that you and I know now, which make us Monday morning quarterbacks- these same things are things the Bush administration knew AT THE TIME. I don't know why you give them a pass. The difficulties and costs were predicted and squelched, and when Cheney, Bush, and Rumsfeld talk about the inherent fog of war, that none of this was predicted, they are lying, plain and simple.
2) You can say Iraq wasn't an over-reaction to the terrorist threat because Iraq had nothing to do with terrorism. It was a rogue state with WMD problem. But you have to acknowledge that the Bush administration used the terror issue as cover for the Iraq operation, channeling the legitimate anger and fear from one incident into another mission entirely. The logic that we needed to get at the roots of terrorism by remaking Iraq into a liberal democracy is such a logically roundabout, Leninist line of argument for our actions in Iraq that I'm ashamed I actually believed it for the time that I did.
3) The biggest obstacle was from our allies? You need to explain this. For the military dimension, the lack of allies was a blessing, because it side-stepped the arduous war-by-committee that was Kosovo. If you mean the lack of moral support and post-war help from allies- you can't honestly say, in 2006, that these countries should have said to Bush:
"We think your Leninist social engineering project is totally misguided- this project which you want us to endorse even though you are not letting us be involved in planning it. But sure, we'll be happy to endorse your actions and help you clean up whatever mess you make."
4) Your tacit acceptance of the Bush administration's ruthless deceit and egregious incompetence makes me skeptical that you are taking your own advice of learning from past mistakes and getting wiser on these matters.
1) if bush, cheney, and rumsfeld knew all what we know now beforehand - why would they have advocated the war? if they knew we wouldn't be treated as liberators, if they knew the insurgency would last this long and fight this viciously, if they knew america's support would erode - what logic are you assuming they were using. we'll go hit saddam on the head and show him what's up and who cares about the public fallout afterwards? come on, you honestly think that's what they were thinking. at the most, they were naive, and made poor decisions once the thing got started. but i don't believe for a second they could or did know about how the insurgency would behave.
2) rogue states certainly have to do with the terrorist problem. they are not separate issues. the question is whether Iraq had to do with the al queda problem - which is a legitimate line of inquiry, but the history of islamic terrorism is tied up in failed/rogue states - lebanon, gaza, afghanistan, sudan.
anyhow, rather than castigating the iraq mission as leninist, it seems to me it might be more reasonable to say it was worth a shot and failed, and so we won't be trying it again in the future, that is, if you think it's a failure.
3) yes, the biggest obstacle came from the perceived lack of legitimacy from the UN and Arab neighbors. i think that would have helped quell the insurgency, although it may have made the initial ass kicking of saddam more difficult. i'm talking about the lack of support for going into iraq.
4) i'm just not sure self flagellating or screaming at the top of my lungs that the bush team are liars demonstrates learning. i don't buy into the argument that they knew everything beforehand and deliberately misled everyone....i think they made some poor decisions for post invasion and really screwed up the torture issue.
i also think if there were any alternative strategies that sounded better than the bush strategy, then and now, i would have been receptive to it if I thought it would work. i don't follow the republican party line for hardly any issue, but for this one, it so happens that i think they got a difficult issue more right than the alternatives.
1) I don't have a problem with Bush, et al. believing a certain scenario was the most probable one: a swift victory followed by a swift establishment of a new government. The problem is that they didn't plan for alternate possibilities, and then actively suppressed people who wanted to plan for those possibilities. It is a combination of naiviete about what to expect in Iraq, combined a Machiavelian oppression of other views.
It's a religious adherence to a certain set of preferable outcomes. Why did they ignore the perils of messy reconstruction? Unlike you, who seem willing to see plain old human error, I see this mistake as stemming from the fact (backed up by all the evidence) that remaking Iraq into a liberal democracy was never the main goal. The main goal was to flex American might in a region that had been long neglected. (If it was strictly about WMD, we would have gone into North Korea)
2) Cuba is a rogue state, and they aren't tied up in terrorism. Iraq appears to be far more similar to Cuba than it is to Iran, at least concerning relationships with terrorists and Islamic fundamentalists. Iraq, in retrospect, was not a logical follow-up after 9-11 or as part of a "war on terror."
3) I don't understand the argument you are making here. Would our operation in Iraq have been easier if we had more allies? Sure. But you seem to want to pick the good parts of the UN (legitimacy, more boots on the ground) and leave out the bad (endless chicanery, delayed action). You can't have your cake and eat it too.
4) I'm not sure posting a comment on a blog qualifies as screaming at the top of my lungs, or that admitting I was wrong in the past stands for self-flagellation.
If you can still say right now, in September 2006, that the Bush plan for Iraq was the best one at the time, I simply can't have a dialogue with that kind of reasoning. There were a variety of aggressive approaches to Iraq that could been applied pressure in different ways. Saying there were no tough options outside of Bush's rush to war is something of a strawman. Imagine what Tom Friedman would have done iif he had been President instead of Bush. I'm sure it would have been tough, but I'm also sure it wouldn't have been stupid. There were other options on the table.
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