Iraq and Why We Shouldn't Leave
For all the pragmatic talk about why we are failing in Iraq, why we should scale back or leave or try different strategies, etc, the question that needs to be answered is how our the withdrawing plan would be different than Beruit of 1983, Mogadishu, the Khobar Towers response, the response to Iraqi intelligence's plan to assassinate Bush I, and leaving Saddam in power after Gulf War I.
We have to acknowledge that the "cut our losses" strategy has failed miserably in the Middle East, that it has allowed the region to become less and less friendly and empowered fundamentalists and autocrats.
The intercepted letter from Zawahiri to Zarqawi shows what Al Queda is thinking about in Iraq and how they are hoping for another "Vietnam" when America decides on the domestic front that the war is not worth it.
War is about winning. And winning does not mean we cut and run and call it a draw. To win means that the other side acknowledges losing - an unconditional surrender. We need Al Queda and the Iraq "insurgency" to surrender and give up fighting. If it takes ten years, it'll take ten years. If it takes a hundred years, so be it.
If we leave without winning, it will be a short sighted relief, the lefties will clamour about not leaving early enough, be happy that GW Bush was proven to be an idiot, and meanwhile, Al Queda will claim victory in Iraq - prove that the US is a "paper tiger" and continue on. Their strategy of making a Caliphate will not work because the Muslim world doesn't want it, but they will continue to attack America in bits and pieces for the forseeable future.
We'll feel safe like we did in the 1990s, but we won't be safe.
UPDATE: Interesting WaPo thoughts on the Zawahiri letter. He's asking Zarqawi for money. Huh. That's weird - and good, I think.
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