Fascinating Article

It's a long 14-page essay written by a British Officer on the things the US Army has done to our own detriment in Iraq. By all accounts, it seems to me a very fair and balanced and honest look at things.

There is a section that describes the institutional differences between the US Army and the British Army, and why the Brits succeeded in limited war in Malaysia while the US Army failed in limited war in Vietnam. This issue, he writes, is that the American Army, since it's conception, was created as an instrument of national survival. It is a conventional warfighting machine. This is in contrast to the British Army, which has always been an instrument of "limited war" or achieving limited goals at limited cost.

In Vietnam, the Army was plagued with the idea that we needed to completely destroy the enemy, which neglected the wider political goals of the war.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are, of course, limited wars. Our Army is designed as a conventional war fighting machine, that is why we used a tremendous amount of Special Forces in Afghanistan.

More Food For Thought:

He writes that the Army relies too heavy on finding technological solutions to problems. In the case of finding intelligence, the army relies upon wiretapping and listening, as opposed to developing humint (or spies). In the case of Iraq, it has led us to becoming distant from the host population, and thus viewed as occupiers, as opposed to friends. He writes, "a predilction for technology encourages the search for the quick, convenient solution, often at the expense of the more logical, enduring solution." Yipers! That sounds right on - not just the American army, but American society.