Updated Thoughts on Tit-For-Tat

In an earlier post, there was a good analysis of why tit-for-tat as a game-theory strategy cannot be beaten.

I thought of a way tit-for-tat can be undermined in a multi-player environoment - (and I just made this term up) - Anonymous Attack Tactic. If a player is put under assault, but they do not know by whom, there is no way they can respond "in kind." They are put into a weaker position relative to the rest of the group. Whether there is an end-game in this strategy, I do not know, but it could be employed enough to strengthen opponents of the opponents. This is a premise behind terrorist attacks - Hezbollah and Hamas are essentially clients of Iran or Syria or whoever funds them at the moment - so Israel cannot respond tit-for-tat directly against Iran. Imagine if a terrorist attack was waged against Israel or the US and no one took responsibility for the attack and it was waged in such a way where multiple parties could of been responsible. Of course, this requires multiple enemies or opponents. But it doesn't need to be strictly terrorist or violence, it can be attacks against reputation or institutions or business interests, whatever, the theory still holds. Someone smarter than me could take this to the next level of analysis...